

91

MEDAL RECORD.

Mc. KAY.

X (D.C.M.)

Alexander.

A+S. Highers. PTE
-...- ...

8/8301

X. 9/105. B. 8 512

-do- -do-

6/4^{B5} 360.

KILLED IN ACTION 17/7/16.


Note: The date is wrong.
He died on 17/6/16.

15

(1) France.

14. 4. 15.

Brickstacks Cuinchy 2



7th Battalion Seaforth Highlanders – Butte de Warlencourt
Battalion Operation Orders for attack of 12th October 1916
(Appendix "B" in War Diaries)

Battalion Order No 1.

Date 11.10.1916.

Reference COURTESY to WERS Map 1/102000

1. 26th Infantry Brigade will attack on 12th October at zero with 89th Brigade on right and South African Brigade on left
Objectives –

1. Enemy trench 17.d. 10. 4. - 17. e. 9. 5.
2. Gird front line.
3. Gird support line

2. Battalion will attack in four waves with two Companies in line, each on a two platoon front. First line from Right to Left D. Company to C. Company. Second Line from Right to Left A. Company to B. Company. Frontage of attack from line 17.d. 8. 0. to 17.b. 10. 3. to line 17a. 9. 0. to 17.b. 1. 7.

Direction of advance. $9\frac{1}{2}$ true 22^d magnetic 10th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders will support attack. 5th Camerons and 8th Black Watch in reserve.

3. D. and C. Coys will take first objective leaving their trenches at zero and will reform there when A. and B. Coys will pass through them and take second and third objectives with E. and F. Coys following in support – Battalion pausing at first objective till 0.23 to allow attack on their right to get up in line. Two Coys A. and S.H. will follow Battalion in close support and die in between first and second objective.

2 Coys A.I. and S. H. to then consolidate first objective.

4. ARTILLERY. At zero there will be intensive barrage on first objective and also 200 yards from our front line lifting after three minutes when our first wave must be 70 yards from it.

Note. Systems of barrage

1. On objective.
2. Barrage creeping back to objective with

Infantry as close up to it as possible throughout.

5. VICKERS GUNS. 4 guns (in pairs) advance behind the

Battalion and allotted to third objective, remaining guns

to positions in rear of Battalion.

6. TRENCH MORTAR BATTERY. 4 guns support advance and then take up defensive positions in vicinity of first objective ready to deal with enemy counter attacks. Remaining 4 guns to positions in rear of Battalion.

7. COMMUNICATIONS BY AIRCRAFT AND BURNERS.

8. When all three objectives taken Battalion will clear and consolidate both Gird trenches and the one trench connecting

7th Battalion Seaforth Highlanders – Butte de Warlencourt –
Battalion Operational Orders for attack of 12th October 1916 (Contd)
(Appendix "B" in War Diaries)

then. When Machine Guns are in position in third objective following garrison will be left in Gird support 1 Officer 1 Lewis Gun and 1 Fighting Section B. Coy and following in Gird front trench 3 Lewis Guns (1 each for A. B. D.) 1 Officer and 1 Platoon B. Coy. patrols being pushed forward as soon as possible.

9. The importance of keeping as close as possible to creeping barrage during the advance of supporting troops on flanks and of tackling undamaged M.Guns from flanks to be impressed on all ranks. Barrage will creep at 50 yards per minute till it is about 200 yards beyond first objective from that it will creep forward from 0.23 at same rate until it reaches about 200 yards beyond our final objective.

10. DRESSING STATION at 3 Fms N. 28.d.7.1. and Regt Aid post in Fiers Mine about N.30.d.9.9.

11. Wide Base Dump at COMBEDROP N.35.a.8.2. Advance Dump N.29.b.1.2. Battalion Dump for Bomb Water S.A.A. and wire at N.23.b.4.8.

12. Coats with socks (spare) and shaving kit to be diared under guard under Company arrangements before assembly position of assembly.

13. 2 Lewis guns (1 each from B. and D. Coys) in Battn reserve at N.23.b.4.8.

14. Reports to N.23.b.4.8. where Battn H. Q. will be in first instance.

15. Following to be carried.

170 rounds S.A.A. per man.

4 bombs. do.

2 Sandbags do.

Filled water bottles.

1 Large entrenching tool per man.

1 carb ration and Iron ration per man.

Haversack and waterproof sheet

100 White Very Lights per Coy.

25 Red do. do.

12 P. Rifle Grenades. do.

25 Yellow Flares do

12 Short wire cutters do.

8 Wire breakers. do.

16. Forming up position. Coys to be formed up in the line at present held by Battalion at one hour before zero

7th Battalion Seaforth Highlanders – Butte de Warlencourt –
Battalion Operational Orders for attack of 12th October 1916 (Contd)
(Appendix "B" in War Diaries)

as follows. D.Cov W.17.d.7.5. to W.17.d.3.1.
C.Cov W.17.d.3.1. to W.23.c.1.8.
A.Cov W.17.d.7.5. to W.23.b.3.8.
B.Cov W.23.b.3.8. to W. 23.b.0.4.

Two Cops 10th A. and S.E. will occupy the four communication trenches joining our front line with support line before A. and B.Cops move into position, 4 guides being left for A. and S. H. 2 by D. Coy 2 by C.Cov. O.C.Cops will ensure that their platoons file into position rapidly and suitably placed for advance in waves as ordered in 2. and that arrangements are made for rapid exit from trenches by means of steps etc.

17. Redistribution. When Battalion has consolidated second and third objectives as ordered and the Vickers guns have been dug in, the men not required for garrison will be systematically withdrawn to the main line of resistance (just S. of crest of Butte Spur W.17.d.) and to our original front line in small parties under Company arrangements - taking over from 10th A. and S.Eight who will withdraw to original support line.

18. Contact aeroplanes will fly over the trenches at one hour after zero when advanced Infantry will light flares in reply to aeroplane signals.

19. Prisoners under 15% escort.

20. Situation reports to be sent in as often as possible.

21. Switches to be synchronised with Adjutant's at 1 p.m.

22. Co-operation. Render assistance if required to Bde on Right and Left. A smoke screen will be maintained on enemy position between LE SARRS and WARLENCOURT from 0 to 0 - 45

23. S.O.S. Signal is 3 red Very lights.

24. Essential that all movements into position be carried out under cover.

R.Horn Lt Colonel

Verbally to Cops
at 10 a.m.

7th Battalion Seaforth Highlanders - Butte de Warlencourt - Attack of 12th October 1916

War Diary Report

7th Seaforth Highlanders - Report.

By 2 p.m. the whole of the Seaforth and the 1st Battalion of the 4th Airborne were in position. The situation was quieter than usual and there was nothing to show that the enemy had noticed our concentration. Barricades were established in the trench just north of the bunker road.

Throughout the morning occasional shells from our own guns dropped into our trenches and necessitated some of the 4th Airborne crossing their trenches. When the barrage became intensive the number of shells which dropped into our own trenches increased.

At 2.5 p.m. our barrage became intensive and continued until 4.5 p.m.

At 3.45 p.m. four Seaforth waves advanced and forcing up in perfect order, followed the barrage closely. The leading wave of the 10th Airborne followed as ordered.

As soon as our infantry advanced heavy hostile machine gun fire was opened from all directions, the hostile artillery barrage, however, was not intensive.

The survivors of the assault reached a point about 25 to 100 yards from our trench, and ultimately dug in about 150 yards in front of our old front line under the command of the only surviving officer, Capt. J. Milligan.

During the afternoon it was impossible to get any definite information. At 4.30 p.m. Captain Milligan reported the situation himself, and after further reconnaissance fresh men were sent forward to assist him in digging a new trench.

Before being able to advance from our own trench the Vickers machine gun section all became casualties from shell fire.

Going to the intensity of the machine gun fire during the afternoon it was quite useless to throw more troops into the attack which had already failed.

Very few of the hostile machine guns had been reported on the

7th Battalion Seaforth Highlanders – Butte de Warlencourt – Attack of 12th October 1916

War Diary Report (Contd)

(2)

11th instant as being active during the Chinese attack, and also from previous information received from the 47th Division.


Owing to the fact that neither H.A. trench nor the hostile machine guns were done in by our artillery the attack was bound to fail.

The Battalion was thrown into this attack at very short notice, with little opportunity for reconnoitring or discovering the effect of our artillery fire, which was ultimately found proved to be totally ineffective by the air photographs received on the 13th.


At 8 a.m. on the morning of the 13th the 5th Gloucesters relieved the remnants of the Battalion.

Original Sketch Map – Butte de Warlencourt Grid Trench & Snag Trench



(Appendix 'C' in War Diaries)



Trench Map 17th November 1916 Butte de Walencourt – Grid & Snag Trenches



Area of 7th A&SH 12th October 1916 Then & Now



7th Battalion Seaforth Highlanders – War Diaries – 12th October 1916

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Field notes
 Statements are required at 1, 2 & 3 days, 1st, 11
 and the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th
 will be prepared in manuscript.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
 (Great leading not required)

COURCELETTE to FLERS 1:10000

| Place | Date | Hour | Summary of Events and Information | Map |
|----------------------|--------------|------|---|---|
| EAUCOURT L'ABBEYE | 12/10 /16 | 7AM | Orders received for attack by 26 INF. BGE to take place at 2.5 pm - 7 th Seaforths & A&SH to be in position of readiness by 1 pm - A & B Coys warned to be ready to leave the FLERS line, behind 2 Coys to A&SH, to move to position of readiness about 10 am. - Bn orders written - 9AM Co left Bn. H.Q. for front line giving Coy. Commanders the complete Bn. orders en route - Bn. H.Q. moved up to FLERS LINE - 11AM Advance Bn. H.Q. consisting of Co. Adj. 1/2 Bn. Runners & a few Signallers occupy a position in front line just north of road about M.17.d.7.0 Bde operation orders (App "A") Bn operation orders (App "B") & sketch map (App "C") are attached - 1PM Bn & 2 Coys to A&SH were in position of readiness as ordered watches were synchronised - at intervals all morning, later both before and after zero our heavies shelled the NE of our front line and missed their target by hundreds of yards they caused many casualties and some of the 10 A&SH cleared out of the assembly position in consequence - hostile shelling during the morning was rather less than usual & enemy showed no signs of having seen the assaulting troops assemble - the ground covered is under their view from the BUTTE - | App "A" App "B" App "C" Attached |

| 9th Div | | | Ref Map COURCELETTE to FLERS 1:10000 | |
|----------------------|--------------|------|--|--|
| Place | Date | Hour | Summary of Events and information | Map |
| EAUCOURT L'ABBEYE | 12/10 /16 | 7AM | Orders received for attack by 26 th INF. BGE. To take place at 2.5pm - 7 th SEAFORTHS & A&SH to be in position of readiness by 1 pm - A & B Coys warned to be ready to leave the FLERS line, behind the 2 Coys of A&SH, to move to position of readiness about 10 am. - Bn. orders written | |
| | | 9AM | Co. left Bn. H.Q. for front line giving Coy. Commanders the complete Bn. orders en route - Bn. H.Q. moved up to FLERS LINE - | |
| | | 11AM | Advance Bn. H.Q. consisting of Co. Adj. 1/2 Bn. Runners & a few Signallers occupy a position in front line just north of Road about M.17.d.7.0 Bde operation orders (App "A") Bn operation orders (App "B") & sketch map (App "C") are attached. Bn & 2 Coys. 10 A&SH were in position of readiness as ordered watches were synchronised - | App. "A" App. "B" App. "C" Attached |
| | | 1PM | At intervals all morning, later both before and after zero our heavies shelled to NE of our front line and missed their target by hundreds of yards they caused many casualties and some of the 10 A&SH cleared out of the assembly position in consequence - hostile shelling during the morning was rather less than usual & enemy showed no signs of having seen the assaulting troops assemble - the ground covered is under their view from the BUTTE - | |

9th Div =

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Unless heading not required)

Ref Map COURCELETTE to FLERS

1:10000

| Place | Date | Hour | Summary of Events and Information | Remarks and References to Attachments |
|----------------------|----------|------|---|---------------------------------------|
| EAUCOURT L'ABBAYE | 12/10/16 | | <p>Messages were sent through 26 BTE & also to the guns (though a field gunner who was at Bn. H.Q. to stop the fire of heavies referred to - (Every shell fired by this gun or guns on the 11th & 12th was wasted either on our own trenches or on no man's land) -</p> <p>2.5pm Bn. waves left the trenches in proper order - formed up according to programme. At the same moment enemy machine guns opened on our parapet from our front & flanks - It is impossible to give exact positions of these guns - One was thought to be firing from long range about M.10.C.3.6 where a gun & several emplacements had been spotted after our charge attack at 3.40pm on the 11th - others from the BUTTE position about M.17.C.3.5 & others from the SNAG trench (1st objective) & one from the GRID trench about M.18.C.2.8. There was comparatively little hostile shelling on our front lines - our own barrage appeared to do no damage to hostile trench or machine guns but on the contrary inflicted many casualties on the assaulting troops - The creeping barrage is believed to have gone forward well but the fixed barrage on the 1st objective to have been hopelessly short - The fire of hostile machine guns & our own artillery was a bad combination & 70% of the attackers (including most of the NCOs & all company officers but two) at once became casualties -</p> | |

| 9th Div | | | Ref Map COURCELETTE to FLERS 1:10000 | |
|----------------------|----------|--------|---|-----|
| Place | Date | Hour | Summary of Events and information | Map |
| EAUCOURT L'ABBAYE | 12/10/16 | 2-5 pm | <p>Messages were sent through 26 BTE, & also to the guns (though a field gunner who was at Bn. H.Q./ to stop the fire of heavies referred to - (Every shell fired by this gun or guns on the 11th & 12th was wasted either on our own trenches or on no man's land) -</p> <p>Bn. waves left the trenches in & formed up according to programme. At the same moment enemy machine guns opened on our parapet from our front and flanks - It is impossible to give exact positions of all These guns - one was thought to be firing from long range about M.10.C.3.6: where a gun and several emplacements had been spotted after our charge attack at 3.40p.m. on the 11th - others from the BUTTE position about M.17.C.3.5: others from the SNAG trench (1st objective) & one from the GRID trench about M.18.C.2.8. There was comparatively little hostile shelling on our front lines - our own barrage appeared to do no damage to hostile trench or machine guns but on the contrary inflicting many casualties on the assaulting troops - The creeping barrage is believed to have gone forward well but the fixed barrage on the first objective to have ben hopelessly short - The fire of hostile machine guns & our own artillery was a bad combination. 70% of the attackers (including most of the NCOs and all Company officers but two) at once became casualties.</p> | |

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Direct handling and reporting)

Ref Map COURCELETTE to FLERS 1:10000

| Place | Date | Hour | Summary of Events and Information | Reference to Annexes |
|----------------------|----------|---------|--|----------------------|
| EAUCOURT L'ABBAYE | 12/10/16 | | The remnants of all 4 Coys reached shell holes varying from 30x to 150x from the objective and also those of the leading wave of 10 th A&SH which had followed - A platoon or more of the LIVERPOOLS of 89 th BDE which was attacking on our right attacked through our right trenches & met the same fate. | |
| | | 2.30 pm | LT COWPER I/C section machine guns reported that all his 4 Vickers guns had been put out of action & asked for instructions - From this time till the Bn. was relieved LT COWPER rendered invaluable services by reorganising the remnants of 3 battalions organising working parties etc. tending the wounded - The trenches were very narrow state to start with - were soon completely blocked with dead & wounded so that reorganisation was very difficult - LT COWPER was the only officer left on the right of the line to take charge. | |
| | | 2.30 pm | Informed BDE that our right was held up by machine guns & that all our Vickers guns were out of action. | |
| | | 3.25 pm | Informed BDE that the SEAFORTH & ARGYLL right coys. had been knocked out by machine gun fire & that nothing further could be done at this point. | |
| | | 3.30 pm | Asked officer in charge ARGYLLS on our left to report situation, informed that 2 platoons A&SH were consolidating in our original front line & that men of other companies had withdrawn to this line. | |

| 9th Div | | | Ref Map COURCELETTE to FLERS 1:10000 | |
|----------------------|----------|---------|--|-----|
| Place | Date | Hour | Summary of Events and information | Map |
| EAUCOURT L'ABBAYE | 12/10/16 | | The remnants of all 4 Coys. reached shell holes varying from 30x to 150x from the objective and also those of the leading wave of 10 th A&SH which had followed – A platoon or more of the LIVERPOOLS of 89 th BDE. which was attacking on our right attacked through our right trenches & met the same fate. | |
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NOTE: 30x to 150x = 30 yards to 150 yards

7th SEAFORTH HIGHLANDERS

WAR DIARY

Armed Forces C. 2115

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs. Part II and The Staff Manual respectively. Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Event heading not required)

6th of page covered to 10:00

Summary of Events and Information

Place: EAUCOURT L'ABBAYE
 Date: 12/10/16
 Hour: 4.45 pm
 Message to BDE that situation unchanged & that we have plenty of men in the trenches to hold them - that many stretchers required after dark as all trenches blocked by wounded & asking for instructions -

4.55 pm Sent around trenches to find out what SEAFORTHS available & only some 2 dozen without NCOs or officers could be found - In addition there were 2 reserve Lewis Guns with teams & some dozen Signallers & orderlies -

5.15 pm Message to BDE that remnants of Bn. & ARGYLLS hold original front line & are disorganized as practically all officers have become casualties, that we are reorganising and await instructions -

CAPT. MCMILLAN comdg A Coy returned under fire to BN H.Q. to report situation that men of SEAFORTHS, ARGYLLS & SOUTH AFRICANS had connected some shell holes about 150x-200x in front of our original line - CAPT. MCMILLAN & CAPT. ADJ. ANDERSON went back to this position to decide whether it could be held & reinforced -

5.40 pm Message to BDE that some of our men were digging in in the shell holes some 200x in front of the original line and this position being reconnoitered with a view to reinforcing with fresh troops and holding it -

3025 W. WILSON ST. TORONTO, ONT. CANADA

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| 7th Seaforth Highlanders 9th Div | | | Ref Map COURCELETTE to FLERS 1:10000 | |
|-------------------------------------|----------|---------|--|-----|
| Place | Date | Hour | Summary of Events and information | Map |
| EAUCOURT L'ABBAYE | 12/10/16 | 4.45 pm | Message to BDE. that situation unchanged & that we have plenty of men in the trenches to hold them - that many stretchers required & after dark as all trenches blocked by wounded & asking for instructions - | |
| | | 4.55 Pm | Sent around trenches to find out what SEAFORTHS available & only some 2 dozen without NCOs or officers could be found - In addition there were 2 reserve Lewis Guns with teams & some dozen Signallers & orderlies - | |
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7th SEAFORTH HIGHLANDERS

WAR DIARY

XIV
C 2118

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(These headings not required)

12/10/16
Ref Map COURCELETTE to FLERS 1:10000

EAUCOURT
L'ABBAYE 12/10/16

50 men of 10 A&SH were sent out to assist in digging this trench with the men (about 50) already there - It was entirely due to CAPT. MCMILLAN'S example & exertions that this trench was made, joined up with our old front line by another 50 of the 10 A&SH & with our extreme right by a company of 9th SEAFORTH pioneers under CAPT. KELTIE & partially to aid him the R.E. under CAPT. REID - This trench helped the next attack on SNAG trench considerably. Just after dark CAPT & ADJT P C ANDERSON reconnoitered to the left and found we were in touch with SOUTH AFRICA, who had not gained ground on our immediate left - he also found we were in touch with the LIVERPOOLS of 89th BDE on our right who were in their original positions and had lost heavily - (There was a liaison officer with the LIVERPOOLS at BN. H.Q. with some orderlies, who had previously made several efforts to elucidate the situation on our right without much success.)
6.30 pm (about) 2 officers of 10 A&SH came up from their Bn. H.Q. to obtain information & take over Coys - one of these brought up a fresh platoon to relieve shaken men & to patrol - ordered 1/2 this platoon under a Sgt. & 1/2 under an officer to patrol Bosch Trench moving out on either side of trench then being dug in front - it is supposed these patrols obtained no information as no reports ever received from them -

| 7 th Seaforth Highlanders | | | Ref Map COURCELETTE to FLERS 1:10000 | |
|--------------------------------------|----------|---------|--|-----|
| 9th Div | | | | |
| Place | Date | Hour | Summary of Events and information | Map |
| EAUCOURT L'ABBAYE | 12/10/16 | 6.30 pm | 50 men of the 10 th A&SH were sent out to assist in digging this trench with the men (about 50) already there - It was entirely due to CAPT MCMILLAN'S example & exertions that this trench was made, joined up with our old front line by another 50 of the 10 A&SH & with our extreme right by a company of 9 th SEAFORTH pioneers under CAPT. KELTIE & partially to aid him the R.E. under CAPT. REID - This trench helped the next attack on SNAG trench considerably. Just after dark CAPT & ADJT P C ANDERSON reconnoitered to the left and found we were in touch with SOUTH AFRICA, who had not gained ground on our immediate left - he also found we were in touch with the LIVERPOOLS of 89 th BDE on our right who were in their original positions and had lost heavily - (There was a liaison officer with the LIVERPOOLS at BN. H.Q. with some orderlies, who had previously made several efforts to elucidate the situation on our right without much success.) (about) 2 officers of 10 A&SH came up from their Bn. H.Q. to obtain information & take over Coys - one of these brought up a fresh platoon to relieve shaken men & to patrol - ordered 1/2 this platoon under a Sgt. & 1/2 under an officer to patrol Bosch Trench moving out on either side of trench then being dug in front - it is supposed these patrols obtained no information as no reports ever received from them | |

7th SEAFORTH HIGHLANDERS

WAR DIARY

Army Form C. 2118

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(To be handed out regularly)

Ref Map COURCELETTE to FLERS 1:10000

| Place | Date | Hour | Summary of Events and Information | Ordering and Instructions to Artillery |
|---------------------|-------|---------------|--|--|
| ERCOUST L'ABBAYE | 12/16 | 9pm 8.50pm | <p>(about) First communication received from 26 Bde: being orders for occupation enemy trench by strong patrols by 10 A & SH. under orders of Lt. Col Kennedy - These orders (App. D) communicated to OC Vickers guns & Trench mortars but nothing further heard of these operations taking place - 10th A & SH then in front trenches were very much shaken & incapable of further offensive action -</p> <p>NOTE Some messages were sent in duplicate by runner & pigeon - There was no telephone communication all day owing enemy shell fire & attempts at visual by lamp were stopped by order B.S.O. owing to possibility of enemy reading -</p> <p>Throughout the night it was impossible to get to work inside the trenches owing to the dead & wounded crowding the narrow trenches together with disorganised remnants & apparently it was impossible to obtain stretchers for the removal of the wounded - Constant messages for stretchers were sent: & had the enemy counter attacked the block in the trenches would have been a very serious matter - The distance the stretchers had to be carried back was in this case very great &</p> | App D marked |

| 7th Seaforth Highlanders 9th Div | | | Ref Map COURCELETTE to FLERS 1:10000 | |
|-------------------------------------|--------------|-------------------|---|-----|
| Place | Date | Hour | Summary of Events and information | Map |
| ERCOUST L'ABBAYE | 12/10 /16 | 9pm 8.50pm | <p>(about) First communication received from 26 Bge: being orders for occupation enemy trench by strong patrols by 10 A & SH. under orders of Lt. Col Kennedy - These orders (App. D) communicated to OC Vickers guns & Trench mortars but nothing further heard of these operations taking place - 10th A & SH then in front trenches were very much shaken and incapable of further offensive action</p> <p>Estimated casualties to BDE. 15 Officers and 450 ORS -</p> <p>Note some messages were sent in duplicate by runner and pigeons -</p> <p>There was no telephone all day owing enemy shell fire & attempts at visual by lamp were stopped by B.S.O. (Battalion Standing Orders) owing to possibility of enemy reading -</p> <p>Throughout the night it was impossible to get to work inside the trenches owing to the dead & wounded crowding the narrow trenches together with disorganised remnants & apparently it was impossible to obtain stretchers for the removal of the wounded - Constant messages for stretchers were sent: & had the enemy counter attacked the block in the trenches would have been a very serious matter- The distance the stretchers had to be carried back was in this case very great &</p> | |

1 - SEAFORTH HIGHLANDERS

WAR DIARY

Army Form 2118

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F. 8 Regs. Part II and the Staff Manual respectively. Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY


(These headings not required)

Ref map COURCELETTE to FLERS 1:10000

| Place | Date | Hour | Summary of Events and Information |
|----------------------|----------|------|--|
| EAUCOURT L'ABBAYE | 12/10/16 | | <p>just credit is due to the men (stretcher bearers & others) who did make this trip constantly along a very narrow trench & through hostile barrages, carrying the wounded - L/C BLACK 'D' Coy as usual did very fine work until he was killed by a shell & so did Pte. N COATES 'B' Coy. - The former entirely on his own initiative had previously on the night of 9th, 10th & 11th brought in 15 of the LONDON Regt. who had been lying out in no mans land for several days & nights -</p> |
| -do- | 13/10/16 | 1AM | <p>Orders timed at 10.40pm for relief of SEAFORTHS by 2 Coys. 5th CAMERONS as soon as possible & to send guides -</p> <p><u>NOTE</u> Guides useless officers are of no use in practice.</p> |
| | | 3AM | <p>Informed by LT. COL. KENNEDY 10th A&SH. That relief had started - This was the first time telephone was used - Relief arrived not long after & were guided to trenches by officers where they lay down behind parados till SEAFORTHS & ARGYLLS had moved out - relief completed about 4.30 AM. when Bn. marched to BAZENTIN LE GRAND via HIGH WOOD & occupied trenches south of that place - Most of our wounded were got inside the trenches before relief but there were not sufficient stretchers with which to evacuate them -</p> |

| 7 th Seaforth Highlanders 9th Div | | | Ref Map COURCELETTE to FLERS 1:10000 | |
|---|----------|---------|--|-----|
| Place | Date | Hour | Summary of Events and information | Map |
| EAUCOURT L'ABBAYE | 12/10/16 | | <p>just credit is due to the men (stretcher bearers & others) who did make this trip constantly along a very narrow trench & through hostile barrages, carrying the wounded - L/C BLACK 'D' Coy as usual did very fine work until he was killed by a shell & so did Pte. N COATES 'B' Coy. - The former entirely on his own initiative had previously on the night of 9th, 10th & 11th brought in 15 of the LONDON Regt. who had been lying out in no mans land for several days & nights -</p> | |
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| | | 4.30 AM | | |

TRENCH MAP



CAMBRIN CHURCHYARD EXTENSION.
PAS de CALMS.

